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SOAP, CREAM OF WHEAT, AND
BAKERIES: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE COLGATE DOCTRINE
EDWARD P. KRUGMAN*
On June 2, 1919, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in United States v. Colgate & Co.1 Colgate had been indicted for
combining with wholesale and retail dealers to fix the retail prices
of Colgate soaps and toilet products. To effect this combination,
Colgate was alleged to have engaged in:
Distribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars and
lists showing uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere
to such prices and notices, stating that no sales would be made to
those who did not; requests, often complied with, for information
concerning dealers who had departed from specified prices; inves-
tigation and discovery of those not adhering thereto and placing
their names upon "suspended lists"; requests to offending dealers
for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices, which
were often given; uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to give
the same; sales to those who did; similar assurances and promises
required of, and given by, other dealers followed by sales to them;
unrestricted sales to dealers with established accounts who had
observed specified prices; etc.2
The district court sustained Colgate's demurrer and dismissed the
indictment, resting on:
The pregnant fact ... that no averment is made of any contract
or agreement having been entered into whereby the defendant,
the manufacturer, and his customers, bound themselves to en-
hance and maintain prices, further than is involved in the circum-
stance that the manufacturer, the defendant here, refused to sell
to persons who would not resell at indicated prices, and that cer-
tain retailers made purchases on this condition, whereas, inferen-
* B.S. 1971, City College of the City University of New York; Ph.D. 1975, New York
University; J.D. 1978, Yale Law School. Member, Cahill Gordon & Reindel.
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
2 Id. at 303.
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tially, others declined so to do.3
The Government appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The opinion was brief, the Court unanimous. Justice McReyn-
olds had some doubts whether the district court had construed the
indictment correctly,4 but he was bound by the rules governing re-
view on writ of error to accept the construction as given,5 and the
failure to charge an agreement was fatal: "In the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly," the Court held, the
Sherman Act "does not restrict the long recognized right of trader
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he
will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance the circum-
stances under which he will refuse to sell."
Colgate is one of the most frequently criticized antitrust deci-
sions;7 for many years its path in the courts was not one of ups and
downs but only of fractional changes in downward slope.8 At bot-
tom (rock bottom), the case holds that an announced system of
resale prices enforced by unilateral refusals to deal, without more,
does not constitute a section 1 violation, but it was an article of
faith among antitrust practitioners that virtually anything would
be enough to take a distribution scheme out of Colgate and into
Dr. Miles.10 Nevertheless, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
3 United States v. Colgate & Co., 253 F. 522, 527 (E.D. Va. 1918), aff'd, 250 U.S. 300
(1919).
' See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 302, 306.
5 Id. at 301-02.
6 Id. at 307.
See, e.g., P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS § 522 (3d ed. 1981).
8 The history of Colgate to 1960 was canvassed in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960), in which Justice Brennan accurately described Colgate as having been
"narrowly limited" by FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922), and subsequent
decisions. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 42. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the catalog of Col-
gate's conduct quoted at the beginning of this Article could not be relied upon in giving
advice on permissible conduct, because the Supreme Court in Colgate affirmed the dismissal
of the indictment only as construed by the district court, not as originally written. See id. at
36-37. Thus, "without an allegation of unlawful agreement there was no Sherman Act viola-
tion charged." Id. at 37 (emphasis in original).
I Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988)).
10 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In Dr. Miles, the Supreme Court held that resale price mainte-
nance by agreement constituted a per se section 1 violation. The general view as to the
scope of Colgate was best put by Judge Moore in George W. Warner & Co. v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960): "The Supreme Court has left a narrow
channel through which a manufacturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of
such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise."
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Co.,11 the Supreme Court picked Colgate up from the ground,
dusted it off, and turned it into the prime exemplar of "the basic
distinction between concerted and independent action-a distinc-
tion not always clearly drawn by parties and courts. 1 2 Justice
Powell's discussion of Colgate in Monsanto was a lesson to inat-
tentive pupils who had been distracted from their basic lessons:
A manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or refuse
to deal, with whomever it likes, as long as it does so indepen-
dently. Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale
prices in advance and refuse to deal with those who fail to com-
ply. And a distributor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's
demand in order to avoid termination.13
Indeed, Colgate was placed on the level of a "doctrine" that must
be protected from being "seriously eroded" by permitting infer-
ences of agreement to be drawn too lightly."4 Nor, apparently, was
this a difficult result to reach: like Colgate, Monsanto was a unani-
mous opinion.1 5
What is one to make of a doctrine that has been repeatedly
given up for dead, only to be revived and declared alive and vi-
brant sixty-five years after it was announced? I suggest that Col-
gate strikes a chord in judges that goes beyond the antitrust laws
and into notions of individual liberty. I suggest, moreover, that the
specific notion of liberty at stake is one of economic liberty, of a
type directly descended from Lochner-era substantive due pro-
cess."6 I do not suggest, of course, that Monsanto was a constitu-
tional case, or that any of the Justices who decided it had constitu-
tional issues anywhere in the front of their minds. But I do think
that Colgate was a constitutional case of sorts, and I am certain
that the Colgate decision, itself was heavily influenced by the Loch-
" 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
12 Id. at 761.
"Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).
1 Id. at 763.
" See id. at 753. Even Justice Brennan, whose 1960 opinion in Parke, Davis had been
one of Colgate's principal premature obituaries, joined in the Court's opinion in Monsanto.
Id. His one-paragraph concurring opinion was confined to pointing out that Dr. Miles re-
mained good law, of Colgate's apotheosis he had nothing to say at all. Id. at 769.
is See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (holding state law setting maxi-
mum working hours for bakers unconstitutional under due process clause). Lochner typified
Supreme Court cases decided from 1897 to 1937, during which time the Court closely scruti-
nized the ends and means of economic regulations pursuant to the due process clause. See
generally L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruIONAL LAW §§ 8-2 to 8-7, at 567-86 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing Lochner era).
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ner mind-set-which was then thoroughly good law. As a matter of
intellectual history, therefore, if not strictly as a matter of prece-
dent, Monsanto is kin to Lochner.1
To support this claim, I begin not with Colgate, but rather
with a case decided four years earlier by a different court. The
court, of course, was the one we pay tribute to in this issue, and
the judge who wrote the opinion was one of the brightest lights of
the Second Circuit's first quarter century. The case was Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co,18 and the judge
was Emil Henry Lacombe.
Judge Lacombe was the prototypical New Yorker. A graduate
of Columbia College and Columbia Law School,19 he spent ten
years in private practice and then became an Assistant Corpora-
tion Counsel for the City of New York, where he had a great deal
of success bringing civil actions to recover assets from the rem-
nants of the Tweed Ring.20 He was named a federal circuit judge in
1887 and, upon the passage of the Evarts Act 2 four years later,
was one of the two founding members of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals. 22 He is said on good authority to have twice declined
nominations to the United States Supreme Court because he did
not wish to leave New York.23 He was not a novice to the antitrust
laws; by 1915, when Cream of Wheat was decided, he had com-
pleted a dialogue with the Supreme Court in United States v.
American Tobacco Co.24 and had written one chapter in the end-
less Lawlor v. Loewe ("Danbury Hatters")25 litigation.
The facts of Cream of Wheat tell the familiar story of a manu-
1:7 I acknowledge that many will see the bend sinister in this relationship.
18 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
19 He graduated from the College at the age of 17 and was so young when he graduated
from the Law School that he had to wait for two years before he could begin to practice.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1924, at 13, col. 5.
20 Id.
21 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The Act of March 3, 1891 is known as the
Evarts Act in recognition of its principal sponsor, Senator William Evarts of New York.
22 N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1924, at 13, col. 5. The other founding member was Judge Wil-
liam Wallace.
21 Wyzanski, Augustus Noble Hand, 61 HARV. L. REv. 573, 577 (1948). As a lifetime
New Yorker, I would be the last to suggest that Judge Wyzanski was retailing unverified
gossip.
24 164 F. 700 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 221 U.S. 106 (1908), on remand, 191 F. 371
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
25 187 F. 522 (2d Cir. 1911) (Lacombe, J.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 729 (1912), on remand
from 208 U.S. 274 (1908), renewed appeal following remand, 209 F. 721 (2d Cir. 1913), aff'd,
235 U.S. 522 (1915).
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facturer trying to maintain control of a multi-tier, independent
distribution system in the face of an aggressive, price-cutting re-
tailer. "Cream of wheat," it turns out, is simply "purified mid-
dlings," a byproduct in the production of wheat flour from wheat
that was "produced by every flouring mill in the United States en-
gaged in the manufacture of wheat flour."' 26 It was "a staple com-
modity regularly quoted and dealt in in all grain markets. 27 The
Cream of Wheat Company bought such middlings, exercising (as
all agreed) great care in their selection, and packaged them for ul-
timate sale to consumers,28 thereby warming the hearts (or at least
the mouths and stomachs) of generations of American children on
cold winter mornings. It was a commercial success, but it ac-
counted for less than one percent of the United States middlings
market. 9
In January 1913, Cream of Wheat changed its pattern of dis-
tribution, probably (as Judge Hough commented in his opinion in
the district court) in response to the then-recent spate of "price
regulation" cases.3 0 Under the new distribution scheme, the com-
pany would in principle sell only to wholesalers, and it accompa-
nied each sale with a retail and wholesale price list that its custom-
ers (and their customers) were "requested" to maintain." Cream of
Wheat's price to the wholesaler was $3.95 per case of thirty-six
packages in car-load lots and $4.10 per case in smaller units; the
"requested" price to retailers was $4.50 a case, which would enable
the "ordinary groceryman to get a modest profit on selling at 14
cents the package."32
A&P, of course, was emphatically not an "ordinary grocery-
man." At the time the action was brought, A&P owned over a
thousand stores in the East and the Midwest, a large proportion of
which were "Economy Stores"-stores having but a single em-
ployee at which "plaintiff seeks to compensate for lack of conve-




30 See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 224 F. 566, 569 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915) (citing Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49-73 (1913)
(White, C.J., dissenting); Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Straus, 222 F. 524 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
225 F. 535 (2d Cir. 1915)).
31 Id.
2 Id. at 569 n.2.
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niences by cheapness of price."33 By its sheer size, A&P could real-
ize substantial economies of scale; it was "in buying a wholesaler
. .., and in selling. . . a very large retailer. 3 4 Recognizing A&P's
presence in the marketplace, Cream of Wheat continued to sell to
it, despite its nominal "wholesalers only" policy, on condition,
however, that A&P charge its retail customers the same fourteen-
cent price that the "ordinary groceryman" needed to make a
profit.3 5
All went well for two years, but in January 1915, A&P broke
ranks and began to sell at a retail price of twelve cents, which was
only made possible by its ability to purchase in carload lots at the
wholesale rate.3 Cream of Wheat thereafter refused to sell to A&P,
and A&P brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging violations
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 2 of the then-
newly enacted Clayton Act.3 7 Judge Hough denied the preliminary
injunction,8 and the Second Circuit, through Judge Lacombe,
affirmed.3 9
As between the two opinions, Judge Hough was troubled by
the ambiguities in the recent Clayton legislation,40 whereas Judge
Lacombe was not. Ultimately, however, neither judge went off on
fine points of statutory analysis. Rather, both considered the case
clear-cut as a matter of policy, and both decided it on that basis. It
is in their expression of that policy that one hears the unmistaka-
ble echoes of Lochner.
Judge Hough:
If it be granted that section 2 does apply, and that defendant's
selection of customers results in unlawful restraint of trade, can it
be possible that such person's evil ways are to be amended, not
by stopping his business, but by adding to his list of customers
33 Id. at 568-69.
:4 Id. at 569.
Id.
" Id. at 569-70 & n.2.
37 Ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Section 2 of the Clayton Act was the predecessor to
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1988).
Cream of Wheat, 224 F. at 567, 575.
" Cream of Wheat, 227 F. at 49.
o See Cream of Wheat, 224 F. at 575. In a charming "Note" appended to his opinion,
Judge Hough stated: "Aided by counsel, I have examined all the public documents I could
find relative to the Clayton Act, hoping to find something of assistance in interpreting the




one or many persons chosen by Congress? Numerous individuals
and corporations have been enjoined from restraining the trade of
other people, no matter how flourishing the offenders' trade
might be, nor how greatly the general volume of trade had in-
creased during the period of restraint. But never before has it
been urged that, if J. S. made enough of anything to supply both
Doe and Roe, and sold it all to Doe, refusing even to bargain with
Roe, for any reason or no reason, such conduct gave Roe a cause
of action. If Congress has sought to give him one, the gift is inva-
lid, because the statute takes from one person for the private use
of another the first person's private property.
Using the word "sell" or "sale" conceals the issue. If a man
prefers to keep what he has, an offer of money to salve the taking
thereof does not prevent such taking from being confiscation. The
Cream of Wheat Company is a purely private concern, except as
regulated by its creating law. It is an ordinary merchant, whose
business is affected by no public use whatever. The statute as
construed by plaintiff descends upon that private merchant, and
commands him to make a contract by which he transfers his
property for price, but against his will. The contract and the price
are legally mere surplusage; the constitutional violation lies in the
compulsion, whereby he is deprived of his property for a private
purpose. If defendant's actual scheme of interstate business is un-
lawful, the United States certainly, and now perhaps an individ-
ual plaintiff, can put it out of business; but neither the nation nor
any individual can take away its property, with or without com-
pensation, for the private use of any one.4'
Judge Lacombe:
Much has been said about the reason why defendant ceased
to treat complainant as an exception to its rule; failure of the lat-
ter to live up to some arrangement, etc. All that seems to be
wholly immaterial. The business of defendant is not a monopoly,
or even a quasi monopoly. Really it is selling purified wheat mid-
dlings, and its whole business covers only about 1 per cent. of
that product. It makes its own selection of what by-products of
the milling process it will put up, and sells what it puts up under
marks which tell the purchaser that these middlings are its own
selection. It is open to Brown, Jones, and Robinson to make their
selections out of the other 99 per cent. of purified middlings and
41 Cream of Wheat, 224 F. at 574-75 (footnotes omitted). One of the omitted footnotes
refers to "the inherent right of refusing business." Id. at 574 n.10. The other raises a fasci-
nating (and prescient) speculation regarding a vehicle by which Congress could achieve
"customer" regulation if it were so ill-advised to wish to do so. Id. at 575 n.11.
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put them up and sell them; possibly one or more of them may
prove to be better selectors than defendant, or may persuade the
public that they are. It is difficult to see how into such a business
as that any novel and exceptional rule of law is to be imported.
We had supposed that it was elementary law that a trader could
buy from whom he pleased and sell to whom he pleased, and that
his selection of seller and buyer was wholly his own concern. "It is
a part of a man's civil rights that he be at liberty to refuse busi-
ness relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal
rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice, or
malice." Cooley on Torts, p. 278. See, also, our own opinion in
Greater New York Film Co. v. Biograph Co., 203 Fed. 39, 121 C.
C. A. 375.
Before the Sherman Act it was the law that a trader might
reject the offer of a proposing buyer, for any reason that appealed
to him; it might be because he did not like the other's business
methods, or because he had some personal difference with him,
political, racial, or social. That was purely his own affair, with
which nobody else had any concern. Neither the Sherman Act,
nor any decision of the Supreme Court construing the same, nor
the Clayton Act, has changed the law in this particular. We have
not yet reached the stage where the selection of a trader's cus-
tomers is made for him by the government.42
Lochner:
The statute necessarily interferes with the right of contract
between the employer and employees, concerning the number of
hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of the em-
ployer. The general right to make a contract in relation to his
business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Under that
provision no State can deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell
labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless
there are circumstances which exclude the right ....
The, question whether this act is valid as a labor law, pure
and simple, may be dismissed in a few words. There is no reason-
able ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right
of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occupa-
41 Cream of Wheat, 227 F. at 48-49. In its brief on appeal, Cream of Wheat repeatedly
pressed the point that the Clayton Act could not require the result sought by A&P but that,
if it did, it was unconstitutional. Brief for Defendant-Appeee at A-7 to A-8, 20, 24, Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
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tion of a baker. There is no contention that bakers as a class are
not equal in intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or
manual occupations, or that they are not able to assert their
rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the
State, interfering with their independence of judgment and of ac-
tion. They are in no sense wards of the State. Viewed in the light
of purely labor law, with no reference whatever to the question of
health, we think that a law like the one before us involves neither
the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the
interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected by
such an act.43
There are, of course, plenty of differences between Lochner
and Cream of Wheat: one was a constitutional case, the other
nominally statutory; one exalted the sanctity of contract, the other
emphasized that the challenged conduct was unilateral; the list can
readily be expanded. But both cases stand firmly on a notion of
individual liberty for economic factors, and it seems to me that
unifying concept is more fundamental to both decisions than is any
distinction one would care to draw.
Where, then, does Colgate fit into this picture? Justice Mc-
Reynolds cited neither Lochner nor Cream of Wheat, but the ech-
oes of both are still there. "The purpose of the Sherman Act," he
said, "is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which
probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of their
rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in trade and com-
merce-in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade." Ab-
sent monopoly, the Act "does not restrict the long recognized right
of a trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private busi-
ness, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal. '4 5 These are Lochner words, especially the
reference to "an entirely private business" 46 and the comment con-
cerning the trader's "own independent discretion. '47 The points
'3 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 57 (citations omitted).
4 Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
45 Id.
4' In Lochner, the distinction between businesses to which the states' police power
could extend and those to which it could not was between businesses or business practices
affecting the "safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public," 198 U.S. at 53, and
those that were simply "private." Id. at 64.
'7 See id. at 61:
The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health law, but is an illegal
interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and employees, to
make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which
1991]
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were neither passing nor accidental; both were immediately made a
second time in quotations from previous Supreme Court antitrust
cases. 48 They are also identical in both tone and substance to the
last paragraph of Judge Lacombe's opinion in Cream of Wheat.49
This was not an accident, either. Although citation to the
Cream of Wheat case did not find its way into the Colgate opinion,
the Second Circuit case was very much before the Supreme Court.
The district court in Colgate had cited Judge Hough's opinion,50
and the Government was at pains to distinguish it in its brief to
the Supreme Court.51 For his part, Charles Evans Hughes quoted
from the opinions of Judges Hough and Lacombe in the body of
his brief for Colgate, 2 but he did not stop there. Rather, he went
so far as to summarize the case in an appendix at the end of his
brief, concluding with a full quotation of the last two paragraphs of
the Lacombe opinion. 3 He also hearkened back (without citation)
to Lochner in arguing that the rule advanced by the Government
would be "a most serious perversion" of the Sherman Act. He said:
So far from being a proper construction of the Act, such a con-
struction, to say the least, would throw its constitutionality into
grave doubt. This is not a case of a public calling or of a business
affected with a public interest, and the ordinary principle of lib-
erty, conserving the right of every man freely to deal or refuse to
deal with his fellow man, that is, the free and untrammelled right
they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts.
, See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307:
"The trader or manufacturer, on the other hand, carries on an entirely private
business, and can sell to whom he pleases." United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 320. "A retail dealer has the unquestioned right to
stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so
because he thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his trade."
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614.
"' See Cream of Wheat, 227 F. at 49; supra text accompanying note 43.
"o See United States v. Colgate & Co., 253 F. 522, 527 (E.D. Va. 1918), afl'd, 250 U.S.
300 (1919).
58 See Brief for the United States at 19-20, United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300
(1919).
52 See Brief for Colgate & Co., Defendant-in-Error at 19, 34, United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); see also id. at 33. In one of the minor ironies of this area of the
law, Justice Hughes had written the Supreme Court's opinion in Dr. Miles eight years
before he successfully distinguished the case as Colgate's counsel. It has been said that
Hughes's presence in both cases is the only point of similarity between them. Jacobson, On
Terminating Price-Cutting Distributors in Response to Competitor's Complaints, 49
BROoKLYN L. REV. 677, 677 (1983).
" See Brief for Colgate & Co., supra note 52, at 41-43.
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to contract or not to contract, applies."
CONCLUSION
One could say a great deal more about the relationship be-
tween Lochner concepts and early antitrust law,55 but I do not pro-
pose to do so. History should be enjoyed for its own sake, and La-
combe opinions are worth reading simply to admire his craft and
style. Read enough of them and one will come to agree with the
New York Times obituary writer who praised Judge Lacombe's
ability to achieve a "thorough mastery of many facts" in presiding
over "some of the most important litigation of his time" but still
thought it worth pointing out that "critics of modern liberal ten-
dencies were sometimes disposed to find the Judge too regularly on
the side of property."56
Plus ga change, plus c'est la mgme chose. In the last few
years, there has been a revival of interest in the relationship be-
tween political liberty and economic liberty, as exemplified not
merely by the tumultuous events in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union but by the American reaction to them. This
is not without controversy; as this Article is being written, a cur-
rent "critic of modern liberal tendencies" writing in the New York
Times is opposing the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Clar-
ence Thomas on the grounds, among others, that Judge Thomas
has been quoted as saying that "economic liberties [are] a vital
part of the rights protected by constitutional government." 7 It is
also the case that antitrust law and antitrust enforcement have be-
come enormously more sophisticated, as the courts have moved
away from simplistic, often bipolar, reasoning to attempts to ana-
lyze alleged restraints in real-world economic terms. In NCAA v.
Board of Regents,5  for example, the Supreme Court gave fresh
vigor to rule-of-reason analysis, which used to be a code-word for
"the defendant always wins." And in Matsushita Electric Indus-
4 Id. at 15.
11 Indeed, a great deal more has been said in May, Antitrust in the Formative Era:
Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989), which contains a comprehensive exposition of the role of "laissez-
faire constitutionalism" in early antitrust decisionmaking.
11 N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1924, at 13, col. 5.
7 Tribe, "Natural Law" and the Nominee, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1991, at A15, col. 4.
58 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Co.,59 the Court held that plaintiff must
proffer and support an economically plausible reason why defend-
ant would have engaged in an alleged restraint in order to escape
dismissal on motion.6
These two trends do not always coexist comfortably; it is pos-
sible to argue that both the -unilateral/concerted distinction of
Colgate and the price/non-price distinction of Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 1 make little economic sense. In this re-
spect, the law of vertical price-fixing is inherently in tension if one
tries to view it solely in economic terms, for as Monsanto demon-
strates, those two questionable distinctions "are at the center of
. . . any. . . distributor-termination case."62 What I have tried to
suggest is that this tension is not merely an aberration but rather
reflects deep-seated instincts of judges who, by training and incli-
nation, see economic and political issues as two sides of the same
coin. Whether this is a good thing, or whether it is a phenomenon
of judges who are older and whiter than the general populace (a
proposition with which Judge Thomas would no doubt disagree), I
leave to individual taste. Few today would dispute Justice
Holmes's gibe that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"6 3 but the libertarian instinct
underlying Lochner did not simply disappear when the case itself
was overruled. It is alive and well in the law of vertical price-fixing
and, I suspect, in many other places as well.
Judge Lacombe would be pleased.
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
80 Id. at 587-88.
81 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
82 Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 760-61.
" Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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